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v.
ALORICA, INC. d/b/a P.R.C. LLC 
a/k/a Precision Response Corp.,
Defendant.
______________________________/
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT’S
MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff, Silvia Curtis Mayorga, a female residing in Miami-Dade County, Florida, 
brings this action against Alorica, Inc. d/b/a P.R.C. LLC a/k/a Precision Response Corporation 
(“Alorica”) pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. 
(“Title VII”), Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. 
(“ADA”), and the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.10 et seq. (“FCRA”). 
Mayorga asserts claims of (1) unlawful sex and pregnancy discrimination, and (2) unlawful 
disability discrimination. This matter is presently before the Court on Alorica’s Motion to 
Dismiss Counts Two and Three of the Plaintiff’s Complaint (D.E. # 24), filed July 11, 2012. 
Alorica seeks dismissal of Counts II and III of the Complaint (D.E. # 1) on the basis that 
Mayorga has not stated a cause of action upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
I. BACKGROUND
Mayorga began her employment with Alorica in 2010 as a customer service 
representative in the company’s DirectTV bilingual retention and cancellation department in 
Miami-Dade County, Florida. In January 2011, Mayorga became pregnant. Having suffered 
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pregnancy was high-risk, and that she needed to be closely monitored. Mayorga informed her 
direct supervisor, Luis Sola, as well as representatives from Alorica’s human resources 
department, of her high-risk pregnancy.
In April 2011, Mayorga informed Sola that she needed to undergo ultrasound testing at 
weeks 14 and 18 of her pregnancy, and requested two days off from work to undergo the tests. 
Mayorga alleges that she offered to find another employee with whom she could swap shifts, and 
to work on her days off to make up for her absences. Sola initially denied Mayorga’s request for 
an excused absence, as well as her proposal to swap shifts with another employee. Mayorga 
alleges that Sola stated, with respect to her undergoing testing for Down’s syndrome: “What’s 
the big deal? Why do you have to test your kid to find out if it’s normal? Is it not normal?” 
Compl., ^ 13. After this interaction, Mayorga’s request to take time off to undergo ultrasound 
testing was granted by a human resources representative.
Mayorga’s ultrasound tests revealed that her baby was, and would be, in a breech 
presentation throughout her entire pregnancy. Mayorga alleges that she suffered from 
“premature uterine contractions, irritation of the uterus, increased heart rate, severe morning 
sickness, severe pelvic bone pains, severe back pain, severe lower abdominal pain, extreme 
headaches, and other pregnancy-related conditions.” Id. ^ 15. The Complaint goes on to allege 
that Mayorga was admitted to the emergency room on three separate occasions for “severe 
complications relating to her pregnancy.” Id. ^ 16 As a result, Mayorga’s doctor ordered her on 
bed rest for three weeks. Mayorga requested three weeks of unpaid leave from Sola, who, again, 
initially denied the request, stating: “I am not going to treat you special because you are 
pregnant.” Id. ^ 17. However, a human resources representative subsequently approved three 
weeks of unpaid leave.
Upon returning to work from her three-week leave-of-absence on June 27, 2011, 
Mayorga was informed by Alorica’s Human Resources Department that she had been 
terminated. A representative told her: “Sorry. I cannot accommodate you. This is a company. 
We need you here. So, since you can’t be here because you are pregnant, we cannot 
accommodate you. Re-apply after you have your baby.” Id. ^ 19.
As a consequence, Mayorga commenced the instant action on April 26, 2012 against 
Alorica. The Complaint alleges three counts: Sex and Pregnancy Discrimination in violation of 
Title VII (Count I), Disability/Perceived Disability Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate
2
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in violation of the ADA (Count II), and Handicap Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate 
in violation of the FCRA (Count III). Mayorga is seeking compensatory damages, lost wages, 
past and future wages, lost benefits, mental anguish, emotional distress, punitive damages, and 
attorneys’ fees and costs.
In its Motion to Dismiss, Alorica argues that Count II of the Complaint should be 
dismissed because Mayorga was neither disabled nor regarded as disabled. Alorica also argues 
that Count III should be dismissed because the FCRA does not recognize a cause of action for 
pregnancy discrimination. For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants in part and denies 
in part Alorica’s Motion to Dismiss as indicated.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
the Court must accept all of a complaint’s factual allegations as true, construing them in the light 
most favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). 
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, “[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain 
. . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and that 
“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). “[T]he 
statement need only give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the ground upon 
which it rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) and Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). The plaintiff must 
nevertheless articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual 
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Rule 8 “demands more than 
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 555). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere 
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. Thus, a pleading that offers mere “labels and 
conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” will not survive 
dismissal. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
In applying the Supreme Court’s directives in Twombly and Iqbal, the Eleventh Circuit 
has provided the following guidance to the district courts:
3
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In considering a motion to dismiss, a court should 1) eliminate any 
allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 
2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, assume their 
veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an 
entitlement to relief. Further, courts may infer from the factual 
allegations in the complaint obvious alternative explanation[s], 
which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the 
plaintiff would ask the court to infer.
Kivisto v. Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, PLC, 413 F. App’x 136, 138 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(quoting Am. Dental A ss’n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010)). “This is a 
stricter standard than the Supreme Court described in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 
(1957), which held that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim ‘unless it 
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.’” Mukamal v. Bakes, 378 F. App’x 890, 896 (11th Cir. 2010) 
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 577). These precepts apply to all civil actions, regardless of the 
cause of action alleged. Kivisto, 413 F. App’x at 138.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Disability/Perceived Disability Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate 
under the ADA
The ADA prohibits discrimination “against a qualified individual on the basis of 
disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of 
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). In order to establish a primafacie case of discrimination 
under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) she is disabled under the ADA, (2) she is a 
qualified individual, and (3) she was unlawfully discriminated against because of her disability. 
Knowles v. Sheriff, 460 F. App’x 833, 835 (11th Cir. 2012); Rossbach v. City o f Miami, 371 F.3d 
1354, 1356-57 (11th Cir. 2004); Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2000). To satisfy 
the requirement that an individual is “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA, the individual 
must demonstrate: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded 
as having such an impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(C). With respect to Count II, 
Mayorga is proceeding under both subsections (A) and (C), alleging in the alternative that
4
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Alorica discriminated against her and refused to provide a reasonable accommodation based on 
her actual disability, and based on Alorica regarding her as disabled. As discussed below, the 
Complaint pleads sufficient allegations under both theories to survive the Motion to Dismiss.
1. Actual Disability
Mayorga first alleges that Alorica discriminated against her based on her actual 
disability—her pregnancy-related complications—in violation of the ADA. As noted above, to 
meet the ADA’s definition of actual disability, Mayorga must demonstrate that she had “a 
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities.” 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has defined 
“physical impairment” as “[a]ny physiological disorder or condition . . . affecting one or more 
body systems, such as neurological, musculoskeletal, special sense organs, respiratory (including 
speech organs), cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genitourinary, immune, circulatory, 
hemic, lymphatic, skin, and endocrine.”1 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h)(1). An individual faces a
substantial limitation if the impairment “substantially limits the ability of an individual to 
perform a major life activity as compared to most people in the general population.” Id. § 
1630.2(j)(1)(ii). A “major life activity” is “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, speaking, 
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, interacting with others, and 
working.” Id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i).
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) was intended to make it easier for 
plaintiffs to prove they are disabled under the ADA. 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. § 1630.2(g) 
(citing 154 Cong. Rec. 13,766 (2008) (Joint Statement of Reps. Hoyer and Sensenbrenner on the 
origins of the ADA Restoration Act of 2008, H.R. 3195) (“the primary purpose of the ADAAA 
is to make it easier for people with disabilities to obtain protections under the ADA”)). The 
ADA, as amended by the ADAAA, provides that a disability “shall be construed in favor of 
broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms
1 “Physiologic” is defined as “characteristic or conforming to the normal functioning state of the 
body or a tissue or organ.” Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1464 (2007). Thus, a 
physiological disorder is an abnormal functioning of the body, tissue or organ. See Hernandez v. 
City o f Hartford, 959 F. Supp. 125, 130 (D. Conn. 1997).
5
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of this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1(c)(4). The EEOC has further 
explained that the “substantially limits” requirement is to be “construed broadly in favor of 
expansive coverage” and “is not meant to be a demanding standard.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i). 
Additionally, the term “‘major [life activity]’ shall not be interpreted strictly to create a 
demanding standard for disability.” Id. § 1630.2(i)(2). With these rules of construction in mind, 
the Court turns to whether the Complaint contains sufficient allegations to set forth a plausible 
claim for relief.
In the Complaint, Mayorga alleges that tests revealed that her baby “was, and would be, 
breached [sic] throughout the entire pregnancy,” and that she suffered from “premature uterine 
contractions, irritation of the uterus, increased heart rate, severe morning sickness, severe pelvic 
bone pains, severe back pain, severe lower abdominal pain, extreme headaches and other 
pregnancy-related conditions.” Compl., ^ 15. Mayorga, however, notes that she was able to 
continue working despite these symptoms. See id. The Complaint goes on to allege that “[i]n 
June 2011, Mayorga was admitted to the emergency room at the hospital three times due to 
severe complications related to her pregnancy. As a result, her obstetrician ordered that Mayorga 
be placed on bed rest for three weeks.” Id. ^ 16.
Pregnancy, absent unusual circumstances, is not considered a disability under the ADA. 
See, e.g., Serednyj v. Beverly Healthcare, LLC, 656 F.3d 540, 553 (7th Cir. 2011) (“pregnancy, 
absent unusual circumstances, is not a physical impairment”); Selkow v. 7-Eleven, Inc., No. 11- 
CV-456, 2012 WL 2054872, at *14 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2012) (“Absent unusual circumstances, 
pregnancy is not considered a disability—temporary or otherwise—under the ADA or FCRA.”); 
Jeudy v. Holder, No. 10-22873, 2011 WL 5361076, at *4 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 7, 2011) (noting “that 
pregnancy is not normally considered a disability”); Gorman v Wells Mfg. Corp., 209 F. Supp. 
2d 970, 975-76 (S.D. Iowa 2002) (noting that “a majority of federal courts hold that absent 
unusual circumstances, pregnancy-related medical conditions do not constitute a disability”); 
Villarreal v. J.E. Merit Constructors, Inc., 895 F. Supp. 149, 152 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (“pregnancy 
and related medical conditions do not, absent unusual circumstances, constitute a ‘physical 
impairment’ under the ADA”); Darian v. Univ. Mass. Boston, 980 F. Supp. 77, 85 (D. Mass. 
1997) (“pregnancy-related conditions are not disabilities under the ADA”).
However, the ADA regulations that provide particularized guidance regarding pregnancy 
support a distinction between a healthy pregnancy and a pregnancy-related complication or
6
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condition that may qualify as an impairment: “Other conditions, such as pregnancy, that are not 
the result of a physiological disorder are also not impairments. However, a pregnancy-related 
impairment that substantially limits a major life activity is a disability under the first prong of the 
definition.” 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. § 1630.2(h). Several courts have also acknowledged this 
distinction. See, e.g., Darian, 980 F. Supp. at 85 (“By its terms, though pregnancy per se is not 
covered by the ADA, the Act does not necessarily exclude all pregnancy-related conditions and 
complications.”); Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (“courts have 
distinguished between a normal, uncomplicated pregnancy itself and a complication or condition 
arising out of the pregnancy and have found that, under particular circumstances, the pregnancy- 
related condition can constitute a ‘disability’ within the meaning of the ADA”); Hernandez, 959 
F. Supp. at 130 (“a distinction has been noted between pregnancy and complications caused by 
pregnancy”); Romanelli v. W. & So. Life Ins. Co., No. 06-CV-819, 2007 WL 1231835, at *3 
(M.D. Fla. Apr. 26, 2007) (denying a motion to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged disability 
discrimination in violation of the ADA regarding pregnancy-related complications). Thus, 
where a medical condition arises out of a pregnancy and causes an impairment separate from the 
symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy, or significantly intensifies the symptoms 
associated with a healthy pregnancy, such medical condition may fall within the ADA’s 
definition of a disability.
Here, Mayorga has alleged sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief under the 
ADA for a pregnancy-related complication. The Complaint alleges that Mayorga suffered from 
a physiological impairment—namely, that her baby was in a breech presentation and that she had 
significant pregnancy-related complications resulting in her three emergency room admissions 
and numerous pregnancy-related symptoms—and that Alorica’s decision to terminate her 
employment was based on these impairments. Such allegations, if proven as true, would provide 
Mayorga a cognizable claim under the ADA. In light of the ADAAA’s lenient standards to 
establish a disability, and the pleading standards of Rule 8, the Court finds that Mayorga has 
alleged sufficient facts to state a facially plausible claim of discrimination based on an actual 
disability under the ADA.
Alorica contends that the Complaint is deficient on three grounds. First, Alorica argues 
that the Complaint only alleges symptoms that are consistent with a normal pregnancy, which 
lasted only a short duration. Therefore, according to Alorica, Mayorga could not have had a
7
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disability under the ADA as a mater of law. See Serednyj, 656 F.3d at 554 (noting that “courts 
generally find that short-term, temporary restrictions, with little or no long-term impact, are not 
substantially limiting and do not render a person disabled for purposes of the ADA.” quoting 
Kampmier v. Emeritus Corp., 472 F.3d 930, 937 (7th Cir. 1997)); Gorman, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 
976 (noting that nausea, vomiting, and extreme fatigue are symptoms associated with a normal 
pregnancy). However, the determination of whether the nature, duration, and severity of these 
complications and symptoms qualify as a disability under the ADA is usually a question of fact 
that requires an individualized determination not properly made on a motion to dismiss. See 
Cerrato v. Durham, 941 F. Supp. 388, 393 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (noting that “[w]hile . . . transitory 
and non-chronic impairment are not covered by the ADA . . . the extent and severity of the 
limitations plaintiff faces are factual questions not properly decided on a motion to dismiss.”); 
Garrett v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. o f Trs., No. 95 C 7341, 1996 WL 411319, at *3 (N.D. 1ll. 
July 19, 1996) (noting that “[t]he duration or severity of plaintiff’ s morning sickness cannot be 
determined from the present record. In any event, such factual determinations are not properly 
decided on a motion to dismiss.”); Patterson v. Xerox Corp., 901 F. Supp. 274, 278 (N.D. Ill. 
1995) (noting that it was impossible to ascertain the duration of the plaintiff’s condition on a 
motion to dismiss). While the Complaint alleges that Mayorga was on bed rest for only three 
weeks, the record is silent as to the nature, severity, and duration of Mayorga’s complications or 
symptoms. “[T]he duration of an impairment is one factor that is relevant in determining 
whether the impairment substantially limits a major life activity. Impairments that last for only a 
short period of time are typically not covered, although they may be covered if sufficiently 
severe.” 29 C.F.R. Part 1630, App. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ix) (quoting 154 Cong. Rec. 13,766 (2008) 
(Joint Statement of Reps. Hoyer and Sensenbrenner on the origins of the ADA Restoration Act 
of 2008, H.R. 3195)). It simply cannot be ascertained from the face of the Complaint that 
Mayorga’s pregnancy-related complications or symptoms were not of a sufficient duration and 
magnitude to constitute a disability under the ADA.
Second, Alorica argues that the Complaint is deficient because it does not allege any 
major life activity that was substantially limited by Mayorga’s impairment. The Complaint 
states that “Mayorga suffered medical conditions that substantially limited one or more major 
life activities . . . .” Compl., ^ 32. Alorica contends that the Complaint must identify specific 
life activities that were substantially limited by Mayorga’s impairment. Rule 8 requires that a
8
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plaintiff articulate “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 570. The requirement of establishing a prima facie case is an evidentiary standard 
and not a pleading standard. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002). The 
Supreme Court has held that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not contain a heightened 
pleading requirement for employment discrimination suits. Id. at 514.
Moreover, the EEOC has stated that “[t]he determination of whether an impairment 
substantially limits a major life activity requires an individualized assessment.” 29 C.F.R. § 
1630.2(j)(1)(iv); see also Garrett v. Univ. Ala. at Birmingham Bd. o f Trs., 507 F.3d 1306, 1311 
(11th Cir. 2007) (“Each claim of disability must be considered on a case-by-case basis. When the 
symptoms of an impairment vary widely from person to person, an individualized assessment of 
the effect of an impairment is particularly necessary.”). As noted above, the “substantially 
limits” and “major life activity” requirements do not impose demanding standards, and are to be 
construed broadly in favor of coverage. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(i)(2), 1630.2(j)(1)(i). 
Examples of major life activities include caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, standing, 
sitting, reaching, lifting, bending, concentrating, thinking, etc. See id. § 1630.2(i)(1)(i). Here, 
Mayorga has alleged sufficient factual content to allow the Court “to draw the reasonable 
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 
Alorica has received fair notice of the claim and the ground upon which it rests. Erickson, 551 
U.S. at 93. The Complaint describes the events leading to Mayorga’s termination and describes 
the basis of her alleged disability. While it appears that Mayorga has set forth facts which 
indicate that she may have suffered an impairment to a major life activity, she does not identify 
that activity. She should do so in order for Alorica to have a fair understanding of her alleged 
impairment. Therefore, Mayorga is given leave to file an amended complaint to allege specific 
activities that were substantially limited by her impairment.
Third, Alorica argues that the Complaint must identify the specific complications that 
resulted in Mayorga’s hospitalization. However, as noted above, the Federal Rules do not 
impose a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits, and Mayorga is 
only required to plead enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. See 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514. While it appears that Mayorga has set 
forth facts which indicate that she suffered from severe pregnancy-related complications, she 
does not identify the complications that led to her emergency room admissions and physical
9
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symptoms. She should do so in order for Alorica to have a fair understanding of her alleged 
impairment. Therefore, Mayorga is given leave to file an amended complaint to allege specific 
complications that led to her emergency room admissions and physical symptoms.
2. Perceived Disability
Mayorga also alleges that she meets the third alternative of the ADA’s definition of a 
disability—that Alorica “regarded her” as having a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C); 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii). An individual can satisfy the “regarded as” definition if she can 
establish that she “has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an 
actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is 
perceived to limit a major life activity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). The relevant inquiry here is 
not about Mayorga’s actual condition, but rather how Alorica “perceived [her] condition, 
including the reactions and perceptions of the persons interacting or working with [her].” Davis 
v. Vt. Dep’t o f Corr., No. 11-CV-164, 2012 WL 1269123, at *7 (D. Vt. Apr. 16, 2012) (internal 
citations omitted).
The ADAAA specifies, however, that the “regarded as” definition of disability does not 
apply to “impairments that are transitory and minor.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B); see also 29 
C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (“It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination by an individual claiming 
coverage under the ‘regarded as’ prong of the definition of disability that the impairment is . . . 
or would be . . . ‘transitory and minor.’”). To establish this defense, Alorica must demonstrate 
that the impairment is both “transitory” and “minor.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f). An impairment is 
transitory if it has “an actual or expected duration of 6 months or less.” 42 U.S.C. § 
12102(3)(B); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f). The regulations, however, do not define minor. To the 
extent that this defense is apparent from the face of the Complaint, it is an appropriate basis for 
dismissing the claim that Alorica regarded Mayorga as having a disability. Vt. Dep’t o f Corr., 
2012 WL 1269123, at * 7; Dube v. Tex. Health and Human Servs. Comm’n, No. SA-11-CV-354, 
2011 WL 3902762, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 6, 2011).
Alorica argues that Mayorga’s “regarded as” claim must fail because it is evident from 
the face of the Complaint that her ailment was transitory and minor. Alorica specifically points 
to the allegation that Mayorga was on bed rest for three weeks and, as such, her “regarded as” 
claim must fail because it was less than the six month ADA definition. Mayorga responds that
10
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there is no concession that “Plaintiff [sic] perceived impairment was for six months or less.” 
Resp., ^ 8. However, the Complaint only alleges that Mayorga became pregnant in January 
2011, it does not identify the approximate dates that Mayorga learned of her pregnancy or first 
informed Alorica of her pregnancy. See Compl., ^  10-11. Moreover, the Complaint does not 
identify when Mayorga ceased to have complications regarding her pregnancy. The Complaint 
only alleges that in April 2011, Mayorga informed her supervisor that she needed to undergo 
testing at weeks 14 and 18 of her pregnancy, and that she returned from her three-week absence 
on June 27, 2011. See id. ^  12, 19. Thus, all of the facts in the Complaint, as it currently reads, 
suggest that Mayorga’s impairment lasted less than six months. Mayorga is given leave to file 
an amended complaint to show that her impairment was not transitory.
Alorica also argues that Mayorga’s impairment was “minor” because all of the symptoms 
that she alleges in the Complaint are “part and parcel” of a normal pregnancy. The ADA does 
not define “minor.” However, as discussed above, whether the nature, duration, and severity of 
these symptoms are sufficient to constitute a disability under the ADA are questions of fact that 
require individualized determination.2 See Chicago Sch. Reform Bd., 1996 WL 411319, at *3; 
Cerrato, 941 F. Supp. at 393; Patterson, 901 F. Supp. at 278; Garrett, 507 F.3d at 1311. Here, 
whether Mayorga’s impairment was “minor” presents a similar question of fact that is not 
properly resolved on a motion to dismiss. It cannot be determined from the face of the 2
2 It is noteworthy that the majority of cases Alorica cites in arguing that Mayorga’s impairment 
was minor were decisions on summary judgment motions that were based on evidence in the 
record. See, e.g., White v. Interstate Dist. Co., 438 F. App’x 417 (6th Cir. 2011); Lewis v. Fla. 
Default Law. Grp., P.L., No. 10-CV-1182, 2011 WL 4527456 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2011); 
Selkow, 2012 WL 2054872; Jeudy, 2011 WL 5361076. Only in Dugay II v. Complete Skycap 
Servs., Inc., No. CV-10-2404, 2011 WL 3159171 (D. Ariz. July 26, 2011) did the court consider 
whether the plaintiff’s impairment was transitory and minor on a motion to dismiss. However, 
Dugay II is distinguishable from the instant case.
In Dugay II, the plaintiff, who suffered injuries in an automobile accident, alleged that his 
employer regarded him as disabled and discriminated against him on that basis in violation of 
ADA. The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on the basis that the actual duration of the 
plaintiff’s alleged disability was three months. Id. at *4. However, the court did not reach the 
issue of whether the plaintiff’s injuries were “minor.” See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(f) (“To establish 
this defense, a covered entity must demonstrate that the impairment is both ‘transitory’ and 
‘minor.’”). Here, it is not evident from the face of the Complaint that Mayorga’s complications 
were “minor” within the meaning of the ADA’s “regarded as” definition of a disability. See 42 
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)(iii).
11
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Complaint, nor the record as it currently stands, whether Mayorga’s impairment was minor. 
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss Count Il’s “regarded as” claim must also be denied.
B. Handicap Discrimination and Failure to Accommodate under the FCRA
In Count III, Mayorga asserts that Alorica discriminated against her based on her 
pregnancy-related complications in violation of the FCRA. The general purpose of the FCRA is 
to “to secure for all individuals within the state freedom from discrimination because of race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 760.01(2). 
Toward that end, the Florida legislature has deemed it unlawful to “discharge or to fail or refuse 
to hire any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, or marital status.” Id. § 760.10(1)(a). 
“Because the FCRA is patterned after Title VII, courts generally apply Title VII case law to 
discrimination claims brought under the FCRA.” Smith v. Naples Cmty. Hosp., Inc., 433 F. 
App’x 797, 799 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Wilbur v. Corr. Servs. Corp., 393 F.3d 1192, 1195 n.1 
(11th Cir. 2004)); accord Jones v. United Space Alliance, LLC, 494 F.3d 1306, 1310 (11th Cir. 
2007); Harper v. Blockbuster Entm’t Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998). Florida 
courts have also construed the FCRA in conformity with the ADA because the FCRA also 
protects employees from discrimination based on disability. Jones v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 
No. 09-22683, 2010 WL 1740713, at * 2 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2010) (citing Wimberly v. Sec. Tech. 
Grp., Inc., 866 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004)); see also Tourville v. Securex, Inc., 769 So. 
2d 491, 492 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); McCaw Cellular Commc’n o f Fla., Inc. v. Kwiatek, 763 
So. 2d 1063, 1065 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
Alorica argues that Count III should be dismissed because there is no recognized cause of 
action for pregnancy discrimination under the FCRA. Both the Florida state and federal courts 
are divided as to whether the FCRA provides a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination.3
3 The Florida Supreme Court has not resolved the issue of whether the FCRA covers pregnancy 
discrimination. See DuChateau v. Camp Dresser & McKee, Inc., 822 F. Supp. 2d 1325, 1333 
(S.D. Fla. 2011); Wahl v. Seacoast Banking Corp. o f Fla., No. 09-81382, 2011 WL 861129, at
*12 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 2011). Moreover, Florida intermediate courts have reached opposite 
conclusions as to whether the FCRA provides a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination. 
Compare O ’Loughin v. Pinchback, 579 So. 2d 788, 791-92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that the
12
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Mayorga argues, however, that the Court does not need to address this issue because Count III 
alleges disability discrimination, rather than pregnancy discrimination, in violation of the FCRA. 
Thus, the salient inquiry here is whether pregnancy-related complications are “handicaps,” and 
therefore actionable, under the FCRA. As Florida courts similarly construe the FCRA and the 
ADA, the Court turns to ADA case law.
As noted above, pregnancy, absent unusual circumstances, is not considered a disability 
under the ADA. However, the ADA regulations and several courts have distinguished between 
symptoms associated with a normal, healthy pregnancy and pregnancy-related complications or 
conditions. Where a medical condition arises out of a pregnancy and causes an impairment 
beyond the symptoms associated with a healthy pregnancy, or significantly intensifies those 
symptoms, such medical condition may constitute a disability within the definition of the ADA, 
and therefore also under the FCRA. See Romanelli, 2007 WL 1231835, at *3 (denying a motion 
to dismiss where the plaintiff alleged disability discrimination on the basis of pregnancy-related 
complications in violation of the ADA and FCRA). Here, Mayorga’s allegations are sufficient to 
state a claim for handicap discrimination based on a pregnancy-related complication or condition 
under the FCRA. Whether the nature and severity of the impairment constitutes a handicap is a 
question of fact that is not appropriately resolved on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, Alorica’s 
Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Count III.
Alorica cites to Walsh v. Food Supply Co. (Walsh I), No. 96-677, 1997 WL 401594 
(M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 1997) and Whiteman v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. 04-80389 (S.D. Fla. 
May 3, 2006), aff’d  273 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 2008) to argue that the FCRA does not apply to
Florida Human Rights Act (as the FCRA was then titled) did not protect against pregnancy 
discrimination), with Carsillo v. City o f Lake Worth, 995 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) 
(holding that the FCRA does cover discrimination based on pregnancy). Indeed, federal courts 
are also not in accordance on this issue. Compare, e.g., DuChateau, 822 F. Supp. 2d at 1336 
(holding that the FCRA does not provide a claim for pregnancy discrimination), Berrios v. Univ. 
o f Miami, No. 11-22586, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2012) (same), Boone, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1326­
27 (same), Fernandez v. Copperleaf Gold Club Cmty. A ss’n, Inc., No. 05-CV-286, 2005 WL 
2277591, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 15, 2005), Frazier v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 
1187 (M.D. Fla. 2003) (same), and Swiney v. Lazy Days R.V. Ctr., Inc., No. 00-CV-1356, 2000 
WL 1392101, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2000) (same), with Constable v. Agilysis, Inc., No. 10- 
CV-01778, 2011 WL 2446605, at *6 (M.D. Fla. June 15, 2011) (concluding that the FCRA does 
provide a cause of action for pregnancy discrimination), Terry v. Real Talent, Inc., 09-CV-1756, 
2009 WL 3494476, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 27, 2009) (same), and Brewer v. LCMMed., Inc., No. 
05-61741, at *4-*5 (S.D. Fla. May 26, 2006).
13
Case 1:12-cv-21578-PCH Document 26 Entered on FLSD Docket 07/25/12 13:32:21 Page 14
of 15
disability discrimination under the FCRA. In Walsh I, the plaintiff alleged she was terminated 
from her employment because of her pregnancy, which the court noted was “a very difficult, 
problematic, and potentially dangerous pregnancy,” in violation of, inter alia, the ADA and 
FCRA. Walsh v. Food Supply Co. (Walsh II), No. 96-677, 1997 WL 714915, at *1-*3 (M.D. 
Fla. Oct. 14, 1997).4 In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted that the 
plaintiff argued that “her pregnancy . . . is considered a handicap under the FCRA of 1992.” 
Walsh I, 1997 WL 401594, at *2. The court rejected this argument, holding that “pregnancy is 
not a ‘handicap’ within the meaning of chapter 760.10(1)(a) of the FCRA for the same reasons it 
is not a disability under the ADA.” Id. (citing Brand v. Fla. Power Corp., 633 So. 2d 504, 507­
09 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)).
The instant case is notably distinguishable from Walsh I. Here, Mayorga is not alleging 
that her pregnancy is a handicap per se within the meaning of the FCRA. Rather, she argues that 
her pregnancy-related complications constitute a handicap. The court in Walsh I  did not address 
the issue of whether pregnancy-related complications may give rise to a cognizable claim under 
the FCRA or the ADA. Walsh I, therefore, is not inconsistent with this Court’s holding that a 
pregnancy-related medical condition that causes an impairment beyond the symptoms associated 
with a healthy pregnancy may constitute a handicap under the FCRA.
Whiteman v. Cingular Wireless, also relied on by Alorica, is similarly distinguishable 
from the instant case. There, the plaintiff alleged that she was terminated on the basis of her 
pregnancy, which was also considered high-risk, in violation of Title VII and the FCRA. 
Whiteman, No. 04-80389, at *5, *9. Specifically, the plaintiff argued that she was singled-out 
for termination by the company during a corporate reorganization that resulted in a reduction of 
force. Id. at *7, *9. The court held that the FCRA does not recognize a cause of action for 
pregnancy discrimination, and that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination under Title VII, and accordingly granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendant. 5 Id. at *11, *17.
4 The court in Walsh I  withheld a recitation of the relevant facts as it address only questions of 
law in its order. The factual predicate for Walsh I  was, however, set forth by the court in Walsh 
II.
5 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered, inter alia, whether “pregnancy is a protected 
characteristic under the FCRA.” Whiteman v. Cingular Wireless LLC, 273 F. App’x 841, 841 
(11th Cir. 2008). In a two-paragraph per curiam opinion, held that the district court properly
14
Like the court in Walsh I, the court in Whiteman did not address the issue of whether a 
pregnancy-related complication may qualify as a disability under the ADA or the FCRA. Rather, 
the plaintiff in Whiteman only alleged claims for pregnancy discrimination under Title VII and 
the FCRA. As noted above, pregnancy, absent unusual circumstances, is not considered a 
disability or a handicap. However, Mayorga alleges that her pregnancy-related complications are 
a disability and handicap under the ADA and the FCRA respectively. Whether these 
complications are of such severity and nature as to entitle Mayorga to relief under the ADA or 
FCRA are factual questions and are not properly resolved on a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, 
Alorica’s Motion to Dismiss is denied as to Count III.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (D.E. # 24) is GRANTED IN PART and 
DENIED IN PART as indicated above. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint 
by August 9, 2012.
DONE AND ORDERED, in Chambers, Miami, Florida, July 25, 2012.
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applied the law to the facts of the case and affirmed the district court’s holdings. Id. The 
Eleventh Circuit did not reach the issue of whether pregnancy-related complications are legally 
cognizable under the ADA or FCRA.
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